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lo the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF THE Case No. 
STATE OF UTAH, ET AL., 8457 
Defendants and Appellants, 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, J 
Intervenor and Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Respondent contends we failed to apprise the court of 
the factual background of this case in our Statement of 
Facts. Counsel state that the only facts involved are 
found in Exhibit 2-I and proceed to set forth part of these 
"facts". Counsel are, of course, entitled to criticize our 
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presentation, but we suggest that we have presented the 
background of this case in the only understandable way. 
The "facts" of this case are admitted. Only questions 
of law remain. Respondent in its voluminous pleading set 
forth in considerable detail the actions that had been taken 
by appellants with respect to expenditures, budgetary con-
trol, personnel and legal representation of the respondent, 
State Board of Education. It was then alleged that appel-
lants asserted they had authority to act in these ways and 
would continue to so act. Finally, it was alleged the actions 
taken and the authority asserted were unlawful. Appellants 
in answer admitted all these allegations, except the last. 
This left nothing at issue save questions of law. Far from 
being academic issues, the questions raised are current, 
fundamental and real controversies with potential conse-
quences, both direct and indirect, of major significance to 
the government of the State of Utah. 
In considering Exhibit 2-I, it is well to keep in mind 
that in addition to the hearsay and irrelevant statements 
contained therein, it does not purport to cover all expendi-
tures, work programs, appointments of personnel and use 
of the services of the Attorney General by respondent dur-
ing the period in question, nor does it purport to cover all 
the situations during the period in question in which appel-
lants have rejected requests made by respondent. At most 
it is an accumulation of the major disputes between respon-
dent and appellants in recent years. 
But we are not concerned here whether Dr. Bateman 
should receive $10,000.00 per year as fixed by the State 
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Board of Education, $6,000.00 as approved by the Board 
of Examiners, or $8,000.00 as determined by the legislature, 
nor is there any issue raised as to whether the employees of 
the State Board of Education should have received pay 
increases in 1948, 1949 and 1950. It may be that these and 
other decisions of appellants were not wise or even that 
the decisions made were arbitrary or involved an abuse of 
discretion. It may also be that the Board of Education has 
been wasteful and extravagant or unreasonable in its de-
mands. The questions before this court, however, are not 
what requests to the appellants by respondents should have 
been granted nor what actions by appellants should not 
have been taken, but rather the questions are whether the 
respondent is subject to any supervision of appellants with 
respect to expenditures, budgetary control, personnel and 
employment of counsel and if so the character and extent 
of this supervision. In this reply brief we will not cover 
the last question which we believe is adequately covered in 
Point VII of our original brief. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
BY OUR CONSTITUTION, THE BOARD OF 
EXAMINERS HAS DISCRETIONARY AU-
THORITY TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE 
ALL EXPENDITURES OF THE STATE BOARD 
OF EDUCATION. 
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POINT II 
BY STATUTE THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS 
HAS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO AP-
PROVE OR DISAPPROVE EXPENDITURES 
OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE BY STAT-
UTE HAS POWER TO APPROVE OR DISAP-
PROVE EXPENDITURES MADE BY THE 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
POINT IV 
THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE IS AUTHOR-
IZED AND REQUIRED BY STATUTE TO AP-
PROVE OR DISAPPROVE ALL APPOINT-
MENTS OF EMPLOYEES MADE BY THE 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
POINT V 
THE BUDGET OFFICER UNDER THE DIREC-
TION OF THE GOVERNOR HAS AUTHORITY 
TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE WORK PRO-
GRAMS SUBMITTED BY THE STATE BOARD 
OF EDUCATION. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BY OUR CONSTITUTION, THE BOARD OF 
EXAMINERS HAS DISCRETIONARY AU-
THORITY TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE 
ALL EXPENDITURES OF THE STATE BOARD 
OF EDUCATION. 
In our opening brief we contended that the Board of 
Examiners ( 1) has constitutional authority which cannot 
be diminished by the legislature to examine all claims 
against the state except salaries and compensation of offi-
cers fixed by law, (2) that a claim includes expenditures 
of state officers and agencies including the respondent, 
and (3) that the power to examine such expenditures com-
prehends the exercise of discretion to grant or deny them. 
We have chosen to discuss only the first two points here 
and refer the court to our original brief for a discussion of 
the latter point. 
A. The Constitutional Authority of the Board of Ex-
aminers. 
Respondent contends that the framers of our constitu-
tion d~d not intend to vest constitutional authority in the 
Board of Examiners. They point to the constitutional de-
bates, particularly the amendment made to Article VII, 
Section 13, inserting the "until otherwise provided by law" 
proviso at the beginning of the section. It is true, of course, 
that the framers of the constitution must have intended 
something by the addition of this proviso, but as we have 
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pointed out in our brief, the most reasonable construction 
of their intention is that they intended to affect only the 
composition and powers of the Board of State Prison Com-
missioners or at most the composition as distinguished from 
the powers of the Board of Examiners. 
This is more than a technical interpretation. The 
framers of our constitution, many of whom were leaders 
of the bar and understood the importance of precision in 
language, spent a full four days of convention sessions 
revising and polishing the constitutional language and 
punctuation to make it conform precisely to the intention 
of the delegates. Surely, they would not have allowed such 
an important matter to slip by unnoticed because their 
"attention" was directed elsewhere (Respondent's Brief, p. 
23). 
No member of the constitutional convention objected to 
the examination of claims against the state by a board of 
examiners. Certain members objected that Sections 12 
through 15 were "legislative" but it seems clear that this 
objection related only to the membership of the various 
boards created by these sections. When these objections 
were made, the delineation of the powers of these boards 
was expressly left to the Legislature with two exceptions: 
the powers of the Board of Pardons and the powers of the 
Board of Examiners. With these two exceptions, you will 
note that the powers of these boards are "as may be pro-
vided by law". This was the wording before the "until 
otherwise provided by law" clause was added at the be-
ginning of each section and is the present wording of the 
sections. When it adopted the "until otherwise provided by 
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law" amendment, the convention had reference only to the 
membership of these various boards. It may have been 
felt that in the future it might not be feasible for the prin-
cipal state officers enumerated to act as members of these 
boards and thus left it open to the legislature to provide a 
different membership. This in no way affects the powers 
of the Board of Examiners and Board of Pardons estab-
lished by the constitution and not subject to change "as 
may be provided by law". 
The framers' intention is clear when it is considered 
that after the proviso was adopted, the following substitute 
to Section 12 was offered but rejected (II Proceedings 
Const. Conv. 1152) : 
"The governor, secretary of state, and attorney 
general shall constitute a board of pardons and shall 
have power to grant [pardons, etc.] * * * sub-
ject to such regulations as may be provided by law." 
Had this substitute carried, the powers of the Board of 
Pardons could have been restricted and controlled by the 
Legislature. That a substitute to the section as it now 
stands was needed to accomplish this demonstrates. that 
the "until otherwise provided by law" amendment was in-
tended to affect only the membership not the powers of 
the Board of Pardons and Board of Examiners. 
It is argued further that the framers of our constitu-
tion, by enacting Article VII, Section 13, with similar or 
identical language to constitutional provisions of other 
states, adopted the judicial construction placed on such 
other provisions in other states. This is sometimes used 
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as an aid to construction, but it is far from conclusive. Its 
value as an aid to construction is considerably diminished 
where, as here, there is no evidence that the framers of our 
constitution knew of or intended to adopt the judicial con-
struction of other states. 
But, these cases from other states are far from defini-
tive. The old Nevada case of Ash v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15, 
stands only for the proposition that expense bills of the 
legislature itself need not be passed upon by the Board of 
Examiners. After much contradictory language and argu-
ment pro and con, the court stated at 5 Nev. 32 that legis-
lative expenses already accrued were claims against the 
state which must be passed on by the Board. The court 
concluded that the failure so to do was only an irregularity; 
and aided by contemporaneous administrative construction 
exempting legislative expense bills from the action of the 
Board and the presumption of constitutionality, the court 
refused to hold the act in question unconstitutional. State-
ments therein that the Board has no constitutional powers 
and that claims made by state agencies are not claims 
against the state must be considered dicta disregarded by 
the court in the later Hallock case, and thus no longer the 
I a w in Nevada. 
Lewis vs. Doron, 5 Nev. 399, is not in point. The sole 
question was whether the comptroller, as well as the Board 
of Examiners, had discretionary authority to approve or 
disapprove expenditures. Expressly stating that the Board 
of Examiners' authority was not affected (the only ques-
tion at issue in the case at bar), the court held that the 
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comptroller also had discretionary authority in the matter 
of claims against the state. 
The California case of Board of Trustees vs. Kenfield, 
55 California 488, does hold that claims by state agencies 
are not within the jurisdiction of a statutory Board of 
Examiners but the reasons for the creation of a statutory 
board may well be very different from the reasons for the 
creation of a constitutional board. 
The reliance of respondent on the Idaho case of State 
vs. State Board of Education, 33 Idaho 415, 196 Pac. 201, 
is misplaced. As pointed out by this Court in University 
of Utah vs. Board of Examiners, et al., 295 P. 2d 348, the 
Idaho Board of Education, acting as regents, have more 
than "general control and supervision of the Public School 
System"-they have "the control and direction of all the 
funds of, and appropriations to, the university". 
Furthermore, this court in State vs. Edwards, 33 Utah 
243, 93 P. 720, and Uintah State Bank vs. Ajax, 77 U. 455, 
297 P. 434, has determined that the framers of our consti-
tution intended to vest constitutional powers in the Board 
of Examiners. As this Court stated in the Edwards case, 
"The Auditor is bound by the constitutional provision. The 
Legislature is so bound, and so are we". In the attempted 
distinction of these cases, the respondent fails. We concede 
that neither of these cases is specifically related to the 
authority of the Board of Examiners over the respondent, 
State Board of Education. That is this case. But we do 
contend that the principles established by this Court in 
those cases applies here. To say that the Court in those 
cases was influenced by the statutes may be correct, yet 
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that in no way diminishes the holding by the court that 
the Board of Examiners is vested with constitutional pow-
ers nor can it make any difference whether the claim in-
volved was subject to approval by a single official rather 
than a multi-member board or agency. The principle is the 
same in both instances. The fact that this court in the 
Edwards and Ajax cases did not discuss all of the conten-
tions here made by respondent does not diminish the author-
ity of those cases for it may have been that these same 
arguments were considered by the court and rejected with-
out discussion as being without substance. Furthermore, 
the principles established by these cases have been applied 
in the operation of state government since they were de-
cided and particularly during the last 15 years. (See Stip-
ulation Exhibit "A", pp. 13-21, R. 43-51). To overturn 
them now should not be lightly considered. 
Respondent advances other arguments based on consti-
tutional interpretation. It is first stated that the constitu-
tion must be construed as a whole, a principle we heartily 
endorse. Next it is said that Article X, Section 8 vesting 
"general control and supervision of the Public School Sys-
tem" in the respondent would be given no effect if our con-
struction of Article VII, Section 13 is correct. On the 
contrary, if respondent's construction of Article X, Section 
8 is correct, the result would be to give no effect to the 
powers vested in the Board of Examiners by Article VII, 
Section 13. As this court has previously determined in the 
other branch of this case, University of Utah vs. Board of 
Examiners, et al., supra, the fran1ers of our constitution 
intended the educational functions of our state government 
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to be subject to the same financial review as all other 
functions of our state government. The court's opinion in 
that case also referred to Article X, Section 7, which de-
clares: "All public school funds shall be guaranteed by the 
State against loss or diversion". This is a provision as 
applicable to the State Board of Education as it is to the 
University of Utah and is a provision which should be 
given the same effect as to both. 
By vesting constitutional powers to examine claims of 
the State Board of Education in the Board of Examiners, 
the authority granted to the State Board of Education to 
supervise the schools is not diminished. The initiative at 
all times is in the respondent. The Board of Examiners 
only reviews that part of the functions of the respondent 
concerned with expenditures. It has only a revisory power 
and the initiation of all action must come from the re-
spondent. 
Again it is argued that the general authority of the 
Board of Examiners is limited by the specific authority 
vested by Article X, Section 8 in the State Board of Edu-
cation. But is not the converse actually the case? The 
State Board of Education deals with all matters relating to 
the public school system. The Board of Examiners 
deals only with financial matters and with respect to 
the functions of the Board of Education deals only 
with the financial aspects of the public school system 
and only after action has been initiated by the State Board 
of Education. Consideration must also be given to the fact 
that the University of Utah, which also operates, in part, 
under a specific constitutional provision, has been held by 
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this court to be subject to the supervision of the Board of 
Examiners. 
Respondent attempts to avoid the effect of the Idaho 
cases and practice by stating that the Idaho constitutional 
provision relating to the Board of Examiners has been 
amended twice and thus the former construction of the 
provision has been impliedly adopted and approved. If that 
is a valid argument, it applies in Utah for Article X, Section 
8, was amended in 1950 after the Board of Examiners had 
made many of the decisions to which respondent now ob-
jects (See Exhibit 2-I). Have not the voters of Utah also 
approved the supervision by the Board of Examiners of 
the financial policies of the respondent? 
B. A Claim Within the Meaning of Article VII, Sec-
tion 13 Includes Expenditures of State Officers 
and Agencies. 
The above proposition cannot be seriously contested 
by respondent. The court below so held and the case of 
State vs. Edwards, supra, involving a mileage claim by a 
state employee so held. See also State Board of Education 
vs. Commission of Finance, 247 P. 2d 435. This court in 
Uintah State Bank vs. Aiax, supra, defined a claim as a 
demand for money "paid into the state treasury * * * 
subject to appropriation by the Legislature, and [payable 
only] by the state treasurer on warrant of the state auditor," 
a definition which certainly includes expenditures of state 
funds by respondent. 
Notwithstanding, respondent contends the 1896 legisla-
ture interpreted the constitution as not including expendi· 
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tures of appropriated funds as claims. Sec. 18, Ch. 35, 
Laws of 1896 provides as follows : 
"The state auditor shall not draw his warrant 
for any claim, unless it has been approved by the 
Board, except for salaries or compensation of offi-
cers fixed by law, or for monies expressly appropri-
ated by statute." 
This statute did not restrict the authority of the Board of 
Examiners since it applied only to the duties of the state 
auditor. Nor did it imply that the Board of Examiners had 
no authority over claims for which an appropriation had 
been made. Sec. 63-6-7, U. C. A. 1953, originally enacted 
as a part of the same statute, declares this authority; the 
Legislature would not have denied authority in the same 
statute. If there is any implication from this section affect-
ing the power of the Board of Examiners, it is the implica-
tion that claims previously passed by the Board of Exam-
iners, approved by the Legislature and money expressly 
appropriated therefor need not be again approved by the 
Board before a warrant can be drawn. Beyond that, the 
statute does not go. In any event, it is a fragile basis for 
an argument in the light of the repeal of this statute and 
the contrary interpretation by the Utah and Idaho courts. 
Respondent further argues (Brief pp. 48-50) that our 
contentions should not be accepted because there are other 
adequate safeguards for the expenditure of public funds. 
Whether the statutes and constitution referred to are ade-
quate to safeguard state funds is a question of opinion and 
policy which, we submit, is not a question before this court 
nor can it properly be decided by this court. But the re-
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spondent misinterprets our contentions by supposing a 
situation where payment has been made or services per-
formed and then the claim is submitted to the Board of 
Examiners. No such situation can arise because the exam-
ination by the Board occurs before payment has been made. 
This error by respondent is perhaps understandable for 
they have referred to statutes which, for the most part, 
grant authority to take action or seek information only 
after the expenditure has been made. The discovery of 
extravagances or irregularities after the transaction is 
complete is informative but seldom effective. There is a 
great deal of truth and good common sense in the old 
admonition against locking the barn door after the horse 
is stolen. 
POINT II 
BY STATUTE THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS 
HAS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO AP-
PROVE OR DISAPPROVE EXPENDITURES 
OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
This point was covered in Point II of our opening 
brief and reliance was placed on Sections 53-3-9, 63-6-7, 
10 and 11, UCA 1953 and Section 12 of the Biennial Ap-
propriations Acts. 
With respect to Section 53-3-9, respondent contends 
that it relates only to the "personal expenses" of the State 
Superintendent of Public Instrucion and the members of 
the State Board of Education. No authority is cited for this 
proposition nor is any definition of "personal expenses" 
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attempted. Does it mean the salary of the Superintendent? 
This cannot be for his salary is specifically covered by the 
last sentence of the section. It certainly does not mean the 
living expenses of the Superintendent. The most reasonable 
construction oi the section is that it requires review by the 
State Board of Examiners of the expenditures of the State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction and the State Board 
of Education with respect to their official functions and 
the carrying out of their duties as prescribed by law. This 
would include the operation of the Department of Public 
Instruction and the payment of the employees thereof. 
It is contended that Section 64-1-6, U. C. A. 1953, first 
found in the Revised Statutes of 1898, relating to expenses 
of state institutions, conflicts with Section 53-3-9. It is 
our position that this statute must be read in connection 
with 63-6-7, discussed below, requiring the Board of Exam-
iners to examine all claims for which an appropriation has 
been made. 
Furthermore, Section 64-1-6 has been modified by 
Section 67-4-4 which provides as follows: 
"67-4-4. Preparation, issuance and drawing of 
warrants-Return of redeemed warrants.-Wher-
ever provision is made by any existing law that any 
warrant or warrants upon the state treasurer, shall 
be prepared, issued or drawn by the state auditor, 
from and after the effective date of this act, such 
provision shall be construed to mean that any such 
warrant or warrants shall be prepared, issued or 
drawn by the department of finance. The state 
treasurer shall return the redeemed warrants to the 
commission of finance." 
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Thus, it is now provided that the Commission of Finance 
rather than the auditor draws all warrants. Implicit in this 
change, which was adopted by Chapter 14, Laws of 1943, 
shortly after the initial adoption of the Finance Commission 
Act, is the authority of the Commission of Finance, as agent 
of the Board of Examiners or pursuant to Title 63, to ap-
prove or disapprove expenditures of the State Board of 
Education. 
Finally, respondent has not brought itself within the 
scope of 64-1-6 as a state institution. An examination of 
the various chapters of Title 64 shows that the only "state 
institution" over which respondent has any authority is the 
Schools for the Deaf and Blind. This has been the case 
since 1898. The statutes dealing with the junior colleges, 
vocational schools and general administration of the De-
partment of Public Instruction have always been found 
in Title 53 or its equivalent and cannot therefore be con-
sidered state institutions within the meaning of 64-1-6. .;1 
With respect to Sections 63-6-7, 10 and 11, U. C. A. 
1953, which you will recall were enacted in 1896, respon-
dent has an elaborate analysis found on pages 51-57. We 
are not here directly concerned with Section 63-6-10 relating 
to claims, the settlement of which is provided for by law 
for which no appropriation has been made nor are we 
concerned with Section 63-6-11 relating to claims for which 
no appropriation has been made where the settlement has 
not been provided for by law. We are concerned with Sec-
tion 63-6-7 which specifically applies to claims for which 
an appropriation has been made. The two former sections 
relate to the examination of miscellaneous tort and some-
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times contract claims which often arise in the operation 
of state government. The latter section, however, although 
including these miscellaneous claims, also covers claims 
arising by state officers and agencies acting under approp-
riations made by the Legislature. The language is clear-
claims for which an appropriation has been made~and, as 
we have previously discussed, a claim is simply any demand 
for money from the state treasury. 
Of the statutes we have noted to support our argument, 
the provisions of the biennial appropriations acts is per-
haps the most important in so far as expenditures for 
salaries is involved, yet respondent has made no answer 
thereto. These sections specifically vest authority in the 
Board of Examiners to approve or disapprove salary sched-
ules. These provisions, together with the provision found 
in recent appropriations acts. (Section 1 (b), Appropria-
tions Act of 1953 and 1955; Chapter 136, Laws of 1953 
and Chapter 164, Laws of 1955) condition the expenditure 
of appropriations by all departments of the state on review 
by the Board of Examiners. See also Sec. 8 of the same 
acts relating specifically to travel expense. 
The matters discussed under this point are, of course, 
immaterial if our contentions under Point I of this and 
our opening brief are sustained for the constitutional pow-
ers of the Board of Examiners would then justify the exer-
cise of financial review, irrespective of statutory authori-
zation. 
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POINT III 
THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE BY STAT-
UTE HAS POWER TO APPROVE OR DISAP-
PROVE EXPENDITURES MADE BY THE 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
The respondent has cited cases purporting to hold that 
under similar statutes to the Utah statute state financial 
agencies have been held to have no discretionary authority 
to disapprove unwise or extravagant expenditures. For the 
most part these cases involve constitutional or statutory 
auditors or auditing agencies acting under laws which do 
not allow the exercise of discretion. In our opening brief 
we discussed the distinction between the powers of auditors 
and the powers of a Board of Examiners or Finance Com-
mission (see appellants' brief, pp. 21-22). It is almost 
universally held and is the rule in this state that a state 
auditor has only ministerial powers, State Board of Land 
Commissioners vs. Ririe, 64 Utah 213, 190 P. 59, but the 
Commission of Finance of Utah is specifically given author-
ity to approve or disapprove proposed expenditures-a clear 
grant of discretion. 
Some of the cases cited by respondent are unquestion-
ably contrary to the contentions of the appellants. We 
respectfully suggest that these decisions are erroneous and 
cannot be applied in Utah under the present Utah statutes 
relating to the Commission of Finance. Particularly is this 
true in view of the history and the purposes for the 1941 
reorganization of state government. Governor Maw put 
it quite succinctly in stating the purpose of the plan was 
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to give Utah a single state government rather than govern-
ment of a hundred separate units. 
In accordance with that purpose, a bipartisan com-
mission was established assisted by a part time advisory 
council. Among other powers, it was given the duty to fix 
salary schedules for all state officers and employees which 
"shall in no case be exceeded without the express approval 
of the commission of finance" (Sec. 63-2-13, U. C. A. 1953). 
Concerning expenditures. other than salaries, the commis-
sion must "approve or disapprove all requisitions and pro-
posed expenditures of the several departments" (Sec. 63-
2-21, U. C. A. 1953). Other powers over purchasing, in-
vestments, insurance and the fixing of bonds were granted. 
Consistent with the scope of the title of Ch. 10, Laws of 
1941, 1st S. S., "An act relating to the financial activities of 
the state and the administration thereof * * * ," the 
Commission of Finance is to exercise these powers with 
respect to "all offices, boards, commissions, institutions, 
arms and agencies of the state government of every name 
or nature now in existence or that may be hereafter cre-
ated * * * " For the first time, a unified comprehen-
sive and well thought out plan of financial service for the 
state was established. Income and outgo could he correlated. 
Detailed information concerning state revenue and state 
expenditures could be obtained for the use of the Legisla-
ture, the departments themselves and the public. 
Such a plan was certain to create friction with the 
departments. No administrator is happy to have his de-
cisions questioned by another agency. Quite naturally he 
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feels that he is the best one to make the final determination 
as to whether a new position should be established, a par-
ticular expenditure made or a salary increased. The diffi-
culty is that this administrator has no knowledge of the 
total picture. He is concerned only with his department 
and has no information or inclination to learn of the prob-
lems of other departments or of the financial condition of 
state government as a whole. Here is where the Commission 
of Finance fills the gap. With up-to-date information of 
the fiscal activities of all state departments, it can control 
state expenditures to assure the best use of state money. 
As a supervisory agency, the Commission can view expendi-
tures more objectively than the administrator who initiated 
them. 
These are some of the purposes for the establishment 
of the Commission of Finance. lVIany arguments both pro 
and con exist as to the desirability of such an agency, but 
these must be left to the determination of the Legislature. 
At present, the statutes grant the Commission of Finance 
in unmistakable language authority to supervise the ex-
penditures of all departments of the state including respon-
dent and we ask this court to so declare. 
POINT IV 
THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE IS AUTHOR-
IZED AND REQUIRED BY STATUTE TO AP-
PROVE OR DISAPPROVE ALL APPOINT-
MENTS OF EMPLOYEES MADE BY THE 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
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Section 63-2-14, U. C. A. 1953, quoted in our opening 
Jrief, is our authority for the above proposition. Respon-
ient contends, ( 1) that this statute has been repealed by 
implication and (2) that the statute conflicts with the con-
~titutional powers of the State Board of Education. 
Section 53-2-8, enacted as a part of Chapter 16, Laws 
of 1951, 1st S. S., is relied upon in support of the first 
point, particularly the general provision of that enactment 
to the effect that all existing statutes inconsistent or in 
conflict with the act are repealed. This clause, however, 
adds nothing to the argument for it is apparent it only 
states the common law result that a subsequent statute 
repeals by implication a prior inconsistent statute. See 
Batchelor vs. Palmer, (Wash.) 224 P. 685; State vs. Becker, 
(Wash.) 234 P. 2d 897; Ex Parte McKelvey (Calif.) 64 P. 
2d 1002; cf. Lagoon Jockey Club vs. Davis County, (Utah) 
270 P. 543. The question then is whether 53-2-8 is incon-
sistent with and thus repeals 63-2-14 by implication. 
It is an established rule of statutory construction that 
repeals by implication are not favored and every reasonable 
intendment is against a construction resulting in incon-
sistency and repeal. See 50 Am. Jur. 562-567, Statutes, Sees. 
561-565 and the Washington and California cases cited 
above. Ireland vs. Riley, 11 Cal. App. 2d 70, 52 P. 2d 1021, 
cited in our opening brief at page 38, is directly in point. 
There a statute authorized the Department of Finance to 
approve or disapprove all contracts made by all state de-
partments. A statute enacted subsequently, authorized the 
Board of Equalization to contract for liquor stamps. De-
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partment of Finance approval of such a contract was held 
necessary. In discussing the question of repeal by implica-
tion, the court stated: 
"* * * the courts will not adjudge a statute 
to have been repealed by implication unless a legis-
lative intent to repeal or supersede the statute plain-
ly and clearly appears * * * Also, the rules are 
especially applicable where a repeal would lead to 
absurd consequences, or where the statute is an im-
portant one relating to a governmental matter, and 
a repeal would be destructive or injurious to the 
public welfare, impair a settled prerogative of the 
government or leave no law whatever on a subject 
concerning which it is necessary that there be a 
positive law of some sort." 
There is no inconsistency between 53-2-8 and 63-2-14. 
The former prescribes the agency to initiate, the latter the 
agency to review. The State Board of Education must nat-
urally be given the power to determine who shall be its 
employees and we do not contend otherwise nor do we con-
tend that the Commission of Finance pursuant to 63-2-14 
can choose the particular employee to be hired or can reject 
a particular employee for personal or political reasons. The 
functions of the Commission under this statute are to 
prevent the unnecessary proliferation of jobs by a particu-
lar agency and to more efficiently utilize the employees 
already employed by that agency or by other departments 
of the state. We can state it no better than the Arizona, 
court in the case of Industrial Commi.ssion vs. Price, 37 
Ariz. 245, 292 P. 1099, that the reviewing authority has , 
nothing to say as to who the employees shall be but much 
to say "as" to their necessity. 
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It is also contended that 63-2-14 is a general statute 
whereas 53-2-8 is a specific statute and that the specific 
controls and supersedes the general. This argument was 
raised and rejected in Ireland vs. Riley, supra, and State 
vs. Brotherhood of Rwy. Trainmen, 37 Cal. 2d 412, 232 P. 
2d 857. Concerning Article X, Section 8, and Article VII, 
Section 13 of the constitution, respondent also makes this 
argument (respondent's brief pp. 42-45). Our answer there 
is the same as our answer here, namely that the more gen-
eral provision is 53-2-8 and the more specific is 63-2-14. 
Under 53-2-8 the Board of Education can examine the 
qualifications of applicants for employment and determine 
who is best fitted for the particular job they have in mind. 
The Commission of Finance has none of these functions, 
does not concern itself with the particular person involved 
and only determines whether the job to be filled is neces-
sary. 
We have discussed in Point VI of our opening brief 
the proposition that the Board of Education is not a fourth 
branch of state government. It has no constitutionally 
vested powers but operates only under powers granted by 
the Legislature. Salt Lake City vs. Board of Education of 
SaU Lake City, 52 Utah 540, 175 P. 654. We further pointed 
out that even assuming a grant of constitutional power 
to respondent to supervise the public school system, the 
contentions here made by appellants do not conflict with 
these supervisory powers. The initiative is always with the 
respondent. The Commission of Finance can only review 
and operate as a check on the unwise or unlawful exercise 
of a limited aspect of the total functions performed by the 
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respondent. These considerations apply with equal force 
to Section 63-2-14. 
POINT V 
THE BUDGET OFFICER UNDER THE DIREC-
TION OF THE GOVERNOR HAS AUTHORITY 
TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE WORK PRO-
GRAMS SUBMITTED BY THE STATE BOARD 
OF EDUCATION. 
That phase of financial review known as budgetary 
control is the question involved here. We contend, in ac-
cordance with the applicable statute, Section 63-2-20, U. 
C. A. 1953, the Governor assisted by the Budget Officer 
has power to "revise, alter, decrease, or change" the 
amounts requested by the Board of Education in their 
yearly and quarterly work programs. Respondent would 
limit this authority to a power to revise, etc., only when the 
amounts requested exceeded the appropriations made by 
the Legislature. It is claimed this construction is required 
because otherwise the authority would be unconstitutional 
as an extension of the veto power or as an unlawful dele-
gation of legislative power. 
The statute is clear and requires no construction. The 
allotments requested can be reduced or changed "if the 
Governor deems necessary". The purposes for such a 
method of financial review are several. Basic to the plan 
is that both the department involved and the disbursing 1 
agencies know with definiteness how much money is avail- I 
able during the period in question and can plan accordingly. 
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It tends to assure the availability of funds throughout the 
biennium by preventing the expenditure of too much at 
the beginning of the biennium with a resulting lack of 
funds at the end of the two year period. Furthermore, it 
gives a necessary flexibility to state financial operations 
by allowing adjustments to be made during the appropria-
tion period. These adjustments, of course, need not be 
reductions for other funds may be made available over and 
above appropriations which were not anticipated at the 
time the appropriation was made. Furthermore, additional 
programs and expenditures, sometimes of an emergency 
nature, can be accommodated. The Legislature cannot, of 
course, anticipate all eventualities which may occur during 
the two-year period for which the appropriations. are made. 
It must invest authority in some official or agency to assure 
that the best use of state monies is achieved. 
The argument that by 63-2-20, the Governor is given a 
continuing veto power is a poor analogy. The veto power is 
a constitutional power residing only in the Governor and 
can be employed by him only under the constitutional limi-
tations. The power of budgetary control is a statutory 
power which, we submit, could be given to any official 
designated by the Legislature. Certainly, if this same power 
to revise, alter, decrease or change requested allotments was 
vested by the Legislature in the Secretary of State, for 
example, there could be no claim that this power is an 
extension of the veto power. The power itself, not the per-
son who exercises it, is the only matter to be considered 
here. 
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The analogy to the veto power is invalid for another 
reason. Once a veto is made of an item of appropriation 
or of any other act of the Legislature, the appropriation or 
statute is obliterated. It can have no further force or effect 
unless the Legislature votes to override. Budgetary control, 
however, is not a final irrevocable action for 63-2-20 ex-
pressly provides the allotments made may be "subsequently 
revised or changed by the governor". Furthermore, a work 
program submitted by a department can be increased as 
well as decreased within the limits of the appropriation and 
other available funds. A veto, being irrevocable, can never 
be "subsequently revised or changed" nor can an item of 
appropriation be increased by independent action of the 
Governor. 
To the argument that this power is an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative power, respondent cites the cases 
of Young vs. Salt Lake City, 24 U. 321, 67 P. 1066; State 
vs. Gross, 79 U. 559, 11 P. 2d 340; Revne vs. Trade Com-
mission, 113 U. 155, 192 P. 2d 563. \Ve have no quarrel 
with the principles of these cases but contend that none of 
these principles have been violated by the authority granted 
the Governor and budget officer under 63-2-20. These cases 
are concededly not in point factually and it may be signifi-
cant that respondent has failed to cite a later case which 
is more factually analogous. In Johnson vs. Bankhead, 120 
U. 71, 232 P. 2d 372, a statute authorized the County Com-
missioners to fix the salary for the County Attorney at 
not to exceed a stated maximum. This Court held such 
power not to be an unlawful delegation of legislative power 
to the County Commissioners. Similarly, the Governor, 
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~ided by the budget officer, may "revise, alter, decrease or 
~hange" requested allotments as he deems necessary, pro-
vided that the aggregate of such allotments shall not exceed 
the stated maximum, namely, "the total appropriations or 
other funds from any source whatsoever made available 
to said department for the fiscal year in question". 
The most obvious answer to the contention that this 
budgetary control power is an unlawful delegation is to 
consider the situation if no such power existed. The ap-
propriation "or so much thereof as may be necessary" (Sec-
tion 14, Chapter 136, Laws of 1953; Section 14, Chapter 
164, Laws of 1955) would be made directly to the respon-
dent as it is now. The respondent, however, would not sub-
mit work programs to the Governor. It would decide how 
much of the appropriation was needed for the two years 
and proceed to spend it accordingly. Perchance, it might 
decide to spend less than the full appropriation. This is a 
power unquestionably held by all executive officers and 
agencies. Yet, no one would suggest that the decision to 
spend less was an unconstitutional action. Therefore, can 
it be reasonably argued that the Legislature, by authorizing 
the Governor as well as the respondent to share in the de-
cision to spend less, was unlawfully delegating its legislative 
power? Clearly the answer is "No". The respondent or 
the Governor merely determine the fact that the respondent 
at a particular time can perform its public functions with-
out the expenditure of the full amount of appropriations 
or other funds available for expenditure. This is not a 
delegation of legislative power, but an exercise of inherent 
executive power. 
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With all deference to the Louisiana, Oklahoma anc 
Montana cases cited by respondent, they are erroneous iiJ 
their discussion of the constitutional questions. The re-
spective courts failed to recognize the true nature of the 
appropriations and of the budgetary control powers granted 
and made the spurious analogy to the veto power discussed 
above. 
CONCLUSION 
For the failure of the court below to recognize and 
apply to respondent the internal system of checks and 
bal~nces on the expenditure of state money and employment 
of personnel provided for in our constitution and statutes, 
the judgment should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
H. R. WALDO, JR., 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General, 
Attorneys for AppeUantB. 
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